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‘The dangers attending these conditions
are evident’: Public Health and the Working
Environment of Lancashire Textile
Communities, c.1870–1939
Janet Greenlees*
Summary. This article examines the position of the working environment within public health prior-
ities and as a contributor to the health of a community. Using two Lancashire textile towns (Burnley
and Blackburn) as case studies and drawing on a variety of sources, it highlights how, while legislation
set the industry parameters for legal enforcement of working conditions, local public health priorities
were pivotal in setting codes of practice. The complexities entwined with identifying the working
environment as a cause of ill health and with improving it were entangled within the local community
health context. In addition, the multiple understandings of Medical Officers of Health surrounding the
remit of their responsibilities impacted the local health context. These did not always parallel national
regulations. Indeed, it was these local, community specific forces that set the public health agenda,
determined its path and the place of the working environment within this.
Keywords: public health; Lancashire; localism; Medical Officer of Health; working environment;
paternalism
While disentangling the causes and responsibilities for ill health is problematic, the
working environment has rarely been incorporated into a community public health
agenda unless an industry-specific disease risk is evident, such as anthrax or byssinosis.
The identification of a specific disease caused by a work process both secured a place
and provided a testing ground for, specific workplace regulations. Without an identifiable
illness specific to an occupational process, regulation and reform were more difficult.1
Working conditions and the atmosphere are prominent examples. Both are key contrib-
utors to individual workers’ well-being and consequently, the broader health of the
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1James Stark, ‘The Factory Environment and the Regu-
lation of Industrial Anthrax in Late-Victorian Britain’,
Soc. Hist. Med., 2012, 25, 343–61; Ian Mortimer
and Joseph Melling, ‘British Government Policies for
the Regulation of Anthrax Infection and the Wool Tex-
tiles Industries 1880–1939’, Textile History, 2000, 31,
222–36; Sue Bowden and Geoffrey Tweedale,
‘Mondays without Dread: The Trade Union response
to Byssinosis in the Lancashire Cotton Industry in the
Twentieth Century’, Soc. Hist. Med., 2003, 16,
79–95; Sue Bowden and Geoffrey Tweedale, ‘Pois-
oned by the Fluff: Compensation and Litigation for
Byssinosis in the Lancashire Cotton Industry’, Journal
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community. Yet associated illnesses, particularly respiratory, are not singular to the
working environment and can be contracted anywhere. Moreover, both the working
and living environment fell within the public health remit.2 Hence, local debates surround-
ing public health reform sometimes incorporated the working environment. Indeed, as a
number of excellent studies have shown, pressure for public health reform frequently
developed from local organisations and officials, especially Medical Officers of Health
(MOsH).3 Furthermore, regional factors contributed to getting industrial diseases recog-
nised and addressed.4 The workplace entered debates through these channels and via
the Factory Inspectors and their role at enforcing state regulation. Scholars have emphas-
ised how the state prioritised business needs over workers’ health and safety and to the
neglect of certain public health concerns.5 For the Lancashire cotton manufacturing indus-
try this is unsurprising and reflects the view that has roots in the nineteenth century that
the cotton factories were fairly safe with little attributable morbidity or mortality.6 Fowler
has argued that cotton operatives themselves turned to the state for action on factory
questions rather than seeking local reforms to dangerous or unhealthy work practices.7
And, well into the twentieth century British cotton textile employers were renowned
for their lack of technological innovation and investment. Yet it is for these reasons, as
well as the influence of the cotton manufacturing industry on early health and safety legis-
lation and the factory inspectorate, that Lancashire cotton towns provide the ideal loca-
tion for analysing how communities framed the boundaries of public health and under
what circumstances the working environment was incorporated. It was because certain
diseases of the factory, including tuberculosis, pneumonia and bronchitis transcended
the living and working environment, that local specificities gained importance for
helping define and shape the parameters of the public health remit.
This article examines the place and importance of the working environment within the
local public health discourse of two leading, neighbouring, Lancashire cotton weaving
towns, which manufactured similar cloth, Blackburn and Burnley. While these two towns
2For the broader environmental impact of steelmaking
and employers health and safety initiatives, see David
Bradley, ‘Occupational Health and Safety in the Scot-
tish Steel Industry, c. 1930–1988: The Road to “It’s
Own Wee Empire”’ (unpublished PhD thesis,
Glasgow Caledonian University, 2012).
3E.g. Joseph Melling, ‘Beyond a Shadow of a Doubt?
Experts, Lay Knowledge, and the Role of Radiography
in the Diagnosis of Silicosis in Britain, c. 1919–1945’,
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 2012, 84,
424–66; Bowden and Tweedale, ‘Mondays without
Dread’; Stark, ‘Factory Environment’; Janet Greenlees,
‘Stop Kissing and Steaming!’: Tuberculosis and the
Occupational Health Movement in Massachusetts
and Lancashire, 1870–1918’, Urban History, 2005,
32, 223–46.
4Geoffrey Tweedale, ‘Occupational Health and the
Region: The Medical and Socio-legal Dimensions of
Respiratory Disease and Cancer in the Lancashire
Textile Industry’, in John Wilson (ed.), King Cotton: A
Tribute to Douglas Farnie (Lancaster: Crucible, 2009),
325–41.
5Bowden and Tweedale, ‘Mondays without Dread’;
Bowden and Tweedale, ‘Poisoned by the Fluff’; Twee-
dale, ‘Occupational Health; Terry Wyke, ‘Mule Spin-
ners’ Cancer’, in Alan Fowler and Terry Wyke (eds),
The Barefoot Aristocrats: A History of the Amalga-
mated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners (Lit-
tleborough: George Kelsall, 1987); Arthur McIvor,
‘State Intervention and Work Intensification: The Poli-
tics of Occupational Health and Safety in the British
Cotton Industry, c.1880–1914’, in A. Knotter,
B. Altena, and D. Damsma (eds), Labour, Social
Policy and the Welfare State (Amsterdam: Stichting
beheer IISG, 1997), 125–42; P. Bartrip and P. Fenn,
‘Factory Fatalities and Regulation in Britain,
1878–1913’, Explorations in Economic History, 1988,
25, 60–74; and Alan Fowler, The Lancashire Cotton
Operatives and Work, 1900–1950: A Social History
of Lancashire Cotton Operatives in the Twentieth
Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), ch. 6.
6A. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880–1950
(Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2001), 120, 124–5.
7Fowler, Lancashire Cotton Operatives, ch. 6.












faced similar health challenges, civic and community leaders set different health reform
agendas. At certain times and under particular circumstances these incorporated the
working environment. This paper argues that whether this environment was given impor-
tance in any given community-health context depended on how that community framed
the boundaries of public health. These local boundaries of public health made the textile
mills of some towns healthier places in which to work than elsewhere. Thus, the article
moves away from occupational health histories which have focused on the regulation of
industrial diseases. Rather, it integrates with public health histories which to date have
emphasised a town’s overall health, that of specific inhabitants, notably women and chil-
dren, or the housing and sanitation conundrum. This article reveals how the importance
of the working environment was closely entwined with the complex, but fluid, locally spe-
cific determinants of public health and the parameters for community public health reform.
The article first provides the broad health context of Lancashire within which the
working environment gathered importance as a community public health concern. It
then considers the forces that set the health agenda in Lancashire towns. Next, it turns
to the case studies of Blackburn and Burnley to highlight community variations in
framing the boundaries of public health and the strength of local determinants. By
doing so, it extends Rosenberg’s argument about framing diseases. The working environ-
ment did not become a health risk until the community agreed that it was, acknowledged
it and responded to it.8 Several multifaceted, fluid and locally specific forces framed the
public health agenda and its parameters in Lancashire.
Public health reform was not merely a matter for legislation. Simon Szreter, Brian
Preston, John Welshman and others have illustrated how entangled within public
health and any successful improvements to the public health of a community are the
socio-economic contributors to health,9 the politics and economics of municipal interven-
tion and their effect on the health of a population.10 Public health movements, working
through local governments, contributed to the late nineteenth-century mortality
decline.11 Yet these movements have local contexts. Socioeconomic factors influenced
8Charles Rosenberg, ‘Disease and Social Order in
America: Perceptions and Expectations’, Millbank
Quarterly, suppl. 1986, 64, 34–55; and Charles Rosen-
berg, ‘Framing Disease: Illness, Society and History’, in
Charles Rosenberg and Janet Golden (eds), Framing
Disease: Studies in Cultural History (Rutgers: Rutgers
University Press, 1997), xiii–xxvi.
9E.g. S. R. S. Szreter, ‘The Importance of Social Inter-
vention in Britain’s Mortality Decline, c. 1850–1914:
A Reinterpretation of the Role of Public Health’, Soc.
Hist. Med., 1988, 1, 1–38; R. J. Woods and
J. H. Woodward (eds), Urban Disease and Mortality
in Nineteenth-Century England and Wales
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984); John Welshman,
‘The Medical Officer of Health in England and Wales,
1900–1974: Watchdog or Lapdog?’ Jnl. Public Health
Medicine, 1997, 19, 4, 449; G. Kearns, W. R. Lee and
J. Rogers, ‘The Interaction of Political and Economic
Factors in the Management of Urban Public Health’,
in M. C. Nelson and J. Rogers (eds), Urbanisation
and the Epidemiologic Transition (Uppsala: Historiska
institutionen, 1989); B. T. Preston, ‘Rich Town, Poor
Town: The Distribution of Rate-Bourne Spending
Levels in the Edwardian City System’, Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers, New Series,
1985, 10, 77–94.
10John Pickstone, Medicine and Industrial Society: A
History of Hospital Development in Manchester and
its Region, 1752–1946 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1983); John Welshman, Municipal
Medicine: Public Health in Twentieth-Century Britain
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2000); F. Bell and R. Millward,
‘Public Health Expenditures and Mortality in
England and Wales, 1870–1914’, Continuity and
Change, 1998, 13, 221–49; Barry Doyle, ‘The Chang-
ing Functions of Urban Government’, in Martin
Daunton (ed.), The Cambridge Urban History of
Britain, 3, 1840–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 287–313.
11Szreter, ‘Importance’.












both community spending priorities and household expenditure, including health and
healthcare choices. Municipal intervention and expenditure were influenced by local
and national politics and the local economy. This article engages with these issues
within the industrial context of Lancashire for the decades surrounding 1900 when the
cotton textile industry dominated numerous local economies. Many towns experienced
both economic growth and recession. Indeed, the economic dependence of some
towns on cotton textiles meant that the community and workforce were sometimes syn-
onymous. It argues that the boundaries, definitions and implementation of the local
public health agenda were more important than legislation in securing improvements
to the working environment. While national legislation gradually set the industry param-
eters for legal enforcement, these case studies reveal how communities interpreted the
limitations of their public health remit. Such an analysis makes more visible the impor-
tance of community understandings of the parameters of public health.
The Setting of the Lancashire Health Agenda
Lancashire textile towns were known for their fiercely guarded local autonomy. Local
health agendas were determined by specific poor health outcomes, the state of the
economy and perceptions surrounding who was responsible for securing reforms. By
the late nineteenth century, Lancashire towns had some of the poorest health outcomes
and lowest health expenditures in Britain.12 Around this time too, the health risks attrib-
utable to the working environment became core issues of debate at both the local and
national levels. Contagious and respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, pneumonia
and bronchitis, among others, dominated Lancashire’s health agenda. Prior to the First
World War, Lancashire had the highest mortality rates in England and Wales, with
leading cotton weaving towns at or near the top of the list (see Table 1). Moreover,
the humid environment in the weaving sheds was believed to be a contributing factor
to the high death rates from respiratory diseases. Consequently, in the decades surround-
ing 1900, the factory atmosphere became a focal point for health debates in Lancashire.
Some health hazards of the working environment were also believed essential to pro-
duction. Many employers and weavers believed that a hot, humid weaving shed mini-
mised thread breakages and was therefore necessary for efficient cloth production.
Indeed, Lancashire’s natural humidity aided the industry’s growth in the county. This
was artificially enhanced in factories, with methods evolving over the years from initially
trays of water under the looms (degging) to spray, either from pipes around the sides
of mills or from overhead valves—a process known as steaming. While other industries
introduced higher levels of steaming, including the dye and print works, weaving
attracted public and governmental attention because the steam was contained in the
buildings with very little ventilation.
The health risks attributable to steaming first came under public scrutiny in 1871 when
Todmorden weavers complained to Parliament about sizing, a kind of glue used to stiffen
thread and cloth. Its composition, combined with the lack of ventilation and the practice
12Alysa Levene et al., Cradle to Grave: Municipal
Medicine in Interwar England and Wales (Oxford:
Peter Lang, 2011), esp. chs 2 and 4.












of steaming, raised concerns about weavers’ respiratory health.13 In 1884, this prompted
the factory inspectorate to claim that: ‘We cannot doubt that during frosty winter after-
noons when steam jets have been for hours in full operation and when the products of
gas combustion have been added to the exhalations from the lungs of workpeople, the
atmosphere of a weaving shed must be in a high degree injurious to constitutions predis-
posed to pulmonary disease or dyspepsia.’14 For the next sixty years, appropriate heat and
humidity levels and ventilation requirements were regularly and forcefully debated by
employers, workers, Factory Inspectors and the Home Office, resulting in government
investigations and legislation setting permissible limits.15 The debates surrounding appro-
priate atmospheric conditions ended in 1928 after two successive Home Office Reports
effectively ‘proved’ that steaming was not harmful to operatives’ health.16 Nevertheless,
these debates about steaming and ventilation reveal more about the defensive squabbles
and attempts at ‘one-upmanship’ between employers, trade unions, the Factory Inspec-
torate and the Home Office,17 than they do about local business practices. Nor do they
provide insight into why towns with the commonality of disease burdens and outcomes
held different understandings of the importance of the working environment to the
broader public health agenda.
Table 1. Death rate per 1,000 population in Blackburn and Burnley, as compared with England and Wales,
1880–1914
Town 1880–89 1890–99 1900–09 1910–15
Blackburn 21.3 20.8 17.3 15.0
Burnley 21.6 20.9 18.3 16.3
England and Wales 19.5 18.3 15.9 13.8
Sources: Adapted from Derek Beattie, Blackburn The Development of a Lancashire Cotton Town (Blackburn:
Rybyurn, 1992), 67; Alan Fowler, The Lancashire Cotton Operatives and Work, 1900–1950: A Social History
of Lancashire Cotton Operatives in the Twentieth Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 51; Table of Health
Statistics by Preston Sanitary Association, 1885, as cited in Nigel Morgan, Deadly Dwellings: The Shocking
Story of Housing and Public Health in a Lancashire Cotton Town, Preston from 1840–1914 (Preston: Mullion
Books, 1993), 105; Geoffrey Trodd, ‘Political Change and the Working Class in Blackburn and Burnley,
1880–1914’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Lancaster University, 1978), 236; Blackburn Medical Officer of
Health Reports, various years; Burnley Medical Officer of Health Reports, various years.
13J. Buchanan, Report by Dr Buchanan on Certain
Sizing Processes used in the Cotton Manufacture at
Todmorden, and on Their Influence upon Health PP
[Cd (203)], LIV, 63, (London: HMSO, 1872).
14J. H. Bridges and E. H. Osborn, Report on the Effects
of Heavy Sizing in Cotton Weaving Upon the Health
of the Operatives Employed PP [Cd (3861)] LXXII
(London: HMSO, 1884), 8.
15Eg. Bridges and Osborn, Report; H. E. Roscoe, Report
of a Committee Appointed to Inquire into the
Working of the Cotton Cloth Factories Act PP [Cd
(8348)] (London: HMSO, 1897), xvii and Evidence,
PP [Cd (8340)], (London, HMSO: 1897), xvii;
F. Scudder, Report on Air Tests in Humid Cotton
Weaving Sheds PP [Cd (2135), X, 629], (London:
HMSO, 1904); H. Freer-Smith, Departmental Com-
mittee on Humidity and Ventilation in Cotton
Weaving Sheds, Report PP [Cd (4484)] XV, 635],
(London: HMSO, 1909); A. Bradford Hill, Artificial
Humidification in the Cotton Weaving Industry. Its
Effects upon the Sickness Rates of Weaving Opera-
tives (IHRB Report, 48), (London: HMSO, 1927);
J. Jackson (Chair), Home Office Report of the Depart-
mental Committee on Artificial Humidity in Cotton
Cloth Factories (London: HMSO, 1928).
16Bradford Hill, Artificial Humidification; Jackson,
Home Office Report.
17For discussion of the government debates, see
Fowler, Lancashire Cotton Operatives, ch. 6,
esp. 148–66.












Broadly speaking, in Britain, public health reforms were the responsibility of town coun-
cils, with only sporadic, indirect involvement from central government. During the nine-
teenth century, the local business elite dominated Lancashire town councils and helped
set the public health agenda. Local business traditions were also pivotal determinants
of medical philanthropy, especially the extent and nature of hospital provision.18 More-
over, most local authorities were reluctant to regulate their own cotton industry in case
this provided economic advantages to neighbouring towns. At the same time, local
accountability contributed to variations in health priorities and reform initiatives, within
which the MOH (Medical Officer of Health) played a key role.19
After the Public Health Act of 1872, towns were required to employ an MOH who was
meant to be independent of council pressures. At the same time, he was directly respon-
sible to the local council and had to adhere to council priorities. This could hamper reforms
and placed the MOsH at the bottom of the medical status hierarchy.20 The MOsH early
remit centred on public health and sanitation and advising local authorities on priorities
and strategies for improving the health of their town. Their power grew as public
health became increasingly medicalised and peaked in the first half of the twentieth
century. The MOsH now also tackled infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis and
sexually-transmitted diseases, food safety and pest control and oversaw welfare pro-
grammes designed to improve the health of mothers and children. As Gorsky and Welsh-
man have demonstrated, this was a broad, challenging and changing remit and the
successes of the MOsH were mixed.21 The MOsH both pursued local initiatives and
took their concerns to the state for action. As Tables 2 and 3 highlight, Lancashire
death rates, particularly those of infants, as well as the rates of infectious diseases
remained amongst the highest in Britain up to the Second World War. With such prob-
lems, the workplace was never a top priority for Lancashire town councils, their MOsH
or the state. Moreover, the state sought to balance health concerns with national eco-
nomic priorities, particularly the vital role that the cotton industry played within this.
The lack of industry wide policy innovation meant that the latter dominated political deci-
sion making.
Although many Lancashire cotton towns specialised in producing certain types of cloth,
business strategy and operational decisions remained firm specific.22 Nevertheless, a
town’s mill owners and managers also discussed best practice, often through the local
employers’ associations. Originally formed to try and protect and maximise profit
margins, the Lancashire textile employers’ organisations also defended and promoted
the employers’ right to conduct work as they saw fit.23 While these associations addressed
18Pickstone, Medicine, 140–5.
19Greenlees, ‘Stop Kissing’, 229–33.
20Ibid.
21Martin Gorsky, ‘Local Leadership in Public Health: The
Role of the Medical Officers of Health in Britain,
1872–1974’, Journal of Epidemiological Community
Health, 2007, 61, 468–72; Welshman, ‘Medical
Officer.
22E.g. M. W. Kirby, ‘The Lancashire Cotton Industry in
the Inter-War Years: A Study of Organisational
Change’, Business History, 1974, 16, 145–59; Steve
Toms, ‘Windows of Opportunity in the Textile Indus-
try: The Business Strategies of Lancashire Entrepre-
neurs, 1880–1914’, Business History, 1998, 40,
1–25; Geoff Timmins, Made in Lancashire: A
History of Regional Industrialisation (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1998).
23Arthur McIvor, ‘Cotton Employers’ Organisations and
Labour Relations, 1890–1939’, in J. A. Jowitt and
A. J. McIvor (eds), Employers and Labour in the
English Textile Industries, 1850–1939 (London: Rout-
ledge, 1988), 20.












issues universal to the industry, they remained locally discussed and determined. There
was no strong, umbrella textile employers’ organisation in Lancashire or even employers
engaged in the manufacture of similar goods or a particular process, such as spinning or
weaving. Local production specificities and peculiarities prevented this. Local business tra-
ditions, practices and priorities superseded broader industrial interests, while creating var-
iations in the working environment.
Workers also contributed to setting the local and national health agenda. The textile
industries were highly unionised with sophisticated local bargaining systems. Throughout
Lancashire, workers and their unions protested many health risks at work, including
fatigue, the heat and humidity, shuttle-kissing, longer hours, more looms, dust and,
later, the carcinogenic oils used on spinning mules.24 Yet unions had to balance reforming
the working environment with other concerns, particularly wages and, during economic
downturns, jobs.25 Consequently, workers’ interest in changing their working environ-
ment was inconsistent, localised and sporadic.
Table 3. Infant mortality rates in Lancashire towns and England and Wales, 1921–30
1921–25 1926–30 1931–35
Blackburn 98 83 64
Bolton 91 82 68
Burnley 113 91 77
Bury 85 79 68
Preston 107 94 81
Rochdale 86 78 78
(Average) 97 84 73
England & Wales 76 68 62
Sources: The Registrar General’s Annual Reports, 1921–30; cited in, and adapted from, Elizabeth Roberts,
A Woman’s Place: An Oral History of Working-Class Women, 1890–1940 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
168; Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health for Burnley, 1936, 162.
Table 2. Death rate per 1,000 population in Blackburn and Burnley, as compared with England and Wales,
1920–39
1920–24 1925–29 1930–34 1935–39
Blackburn 13.65 13.76 13.40 14.83
Burnley 15.46 15.54 13.66 15.00
England & Wales 12.2 12.22 11.96 11.98
Sources: Blackburn Medical Officer of Health Reports, various years; Burnley Medical Officer of Health
Reports, various years.
24E.g. Pamela Dale, Janet Greenlees and Joseph
Melling, ‘The Kiss of Death or a Flight of Fancy?:
Workers’ Health and the Press in the Campaign to
Regulate Shuttle Kissing in the British Cotton Indus-
try, c. 1900–1946’, Social History, 2007, 32, 54–75;
Greenlees, ‘Stop Kissing’; Wyke, ‘Mule Spinners’
Cancer’; Bowden and Tweedale, ‘Mondays without
Dread’; Bowden and Tweedale, ‘Poisoned by the
Fluff’; and Tweedale, ‘Occupational Health’.
25For an industrial parallel, see Ronald Johnston and
Arthur McIvor, Lethal Work: A History of the Asbestos
Tragedy in Scotland (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press,
2000).












The combined factors of minimal legislation, local peculiarities, the individual and dis-
tinctive nature of cotton manufacturers, and workers’ priorities make it difficult to
arrive at a conclusion as to the leading influence on determining the workplace environ-
ment at any given time. Instead, it is better to comment on the different forces involved in
changing that environment and the process itself in different towns. The distinctive fea-
tures in one town that influenced mill managers’ approach to the workplace environment
had less impact elsewhere due to other driving forces.26
Blackburn and Burnley held industrial similarities but political differences. Both towns
were key producers of cheap cloth primarily for export to India and the Far East.
Weaving dominated the local economies of both the towns, although coal mining pro-
vided limited alternative employment for men in Burnley.27 From the late nineteenth
century through the interwar years, Blackburn remained overwhelmingly Tory, with citi-
zens removing any candidates with socialist leanings shortly thereafter.28 One political
party held less dominance in Burnley. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the
Second World War, MPs were primarily a mixture of Liberals and either Conservatives
or Socialists, with the Liberals tending to dominate local government.29 The business
leaders in the two town’s local governments varied from the ‘open-handed and socially
concerned to the tight-fisted’ and narrow minded.30 Moreover, despite a strong presence
on the town councils, cotton masters and their priorities did not always dominate deci-
sions. Local political pressures, work cultures and industrial relations contributed to
setting health priorities in the factories and helped determine their importance within
the local public health agenda.
These industrial similarities and political and social differences make Blackburn and
Burnley ideal case studies for examining if, and if so, under what circumstances, the
working environment gained importance within the local health context. The towns’
faced similar industrial health concerns, yet the political, medical and business contexts
were sufficiently different to allow analysis of the importance of local specificities in
setting the boundaries of public health responsibility.
The Rise and Fall of Blackburn’s Working Environment
By the end of the nineteenth century, Blackburn was the cotton weaving capital of the
world. By the First World War, the town peaked in terms of both population and industrial
output.31 Yet the town had an almost self-inflicted isolation from neighbouring
26For a relatedAmerican argument, see Janet Greenlees,
‘Technological Change and Environmental Inequal-
ities: The New England Textile Industry, 1880–1930’,
in G. Massard-Guilbaud and R. Rodger (eds), Environ-
mental and Social Justice in the City: Historical Perspec-
tives (White Horse Press, 2011), 249–70.
27Less than one-tenth of men in Burnley worked in coal
mining in 1921. Rex Pope, Unemployment and the
Lancashire Weaving Area, 1920–1938 (Preston: Uni-
versity of Central Lancashire, Harris Paper Three,
2000), 2–3.
28Derek Beattie, Blackburn: The Development of a Lan-
cashire Cotton Town (Blackburn: Rybyurn, 1992),
150–3.
29For more on the towns’ politics, see, Joseph White,
The Limits of Trade Union Militancy: The Lancashire
Textile Workers, 1910–1914 (London: Greenwood
Press, 1978), 152–67; Alice Russell, Political Stability
in Later Victorian England: A Sociological Analysis
and Interpretation (Sussex: The Book Guild, 1992),
esp. ch. 2. For the election results for 1868–1924,
see 290–92; Beattie, Blackburn, ch. 3.
30John Walton, Lancashire: A Social History,
1558–1939 (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1987), ch. 11, esp. 231.
31Beattie, Blackburn, 15.












communities.32 The town council sought to address local problems with local solutions.33
This isolation and community cohesion was reflected in the structure of textile work in the
town. After the Preston lockout of the 1850s, the Blackburn Weavers formed their own
association rather than joining with Burnley, Preston and Stockport.34 The Blackburn
Masters chose to live amongst their workers rather than moving to the remote country-
side.35 They paid higher wages than their counterparts in Burnley and Preston and
adopted a form of paternalism that suited both their political and business interests.
The dual motivation behind Blackburn employers’ benevolence modifies arguments
about nineteenth-century paternalism, where individual employers, including Titus Salt
and Robert Owen, directed their benevolence at aiding industry—first by securing a work-
force by providing housing and community amenities and later by reconciling men and
women to the industrial world.36 Employers’ benevolence in Blackburn was more compre-
hensive. In the late nineteenth century, Blackburn’s employers collectively provided
workers’ housing and financed schools, churches and even pubs. They also led the indus-
try in financing community health provision, being the major financial contributors behind
the building of the modern, pavilion style Blackburn Infirmary.37 However, such compre-
hensive benevolence also contributed to Blackburn’s insular nature. In return for such
amenities, workers’ political affiliation was expected to reflect that of their employers,
and to a great extent, it did.38 Whether or not it was these philanthropic investments
that won the respect, devotion and loyalty of the working classes is unclear, but the
workers seem to have accepted the hierarchical society in the town and labour unrest
was rare.39
By the early twentieth century, employer paternalism in Blackburn declined. Amalga-
mations and takeovers amongst the cotton firms diminished the numbers of cotton
masters who could contribute to paternalistic endeavours. Furthermore, the family firms
that had characterized the town were becoming limited public companies. These larger
firms brought increased layers of management, new directors and shareholders, which
widened the gap between workers and the remaining cotton masters.40 Yet somewhat
surprisingly, the good relations between workers and employers remained. Furthermore,
while some of the working classes fled to Labour, the conservative politics that the
nineteenth-century masters had engrained in the workers remained throughout the inter-
war period.41 Combined, community cohesion and the economic, social and political
dominance of cotton weaving to the town throughout the period meant that Blackburn
32Ibid, 41.
33Walton, Lancashire, 231–32 and Trodd, ‘Political
Change’, 132 and 134.
34Andrew Bullen, ‘Pragmatism vs. Principle: Cotton
Employers and the Origins of an Industrial Relations
System’, in Jowitt and McIvor (eds), Employers and
Labour, 27–43, 31–5.
35Patrick Joyce, ‘The Factory Politics of Lancashire in the
Later Nineteenth Century’, The Historical Journal,
1975, XVIII, 545.
36Jack Reynolds, The Great Paternalist: Titus Salt and
the Growth of Nineteenth-Century Bradford
(London: Maurice Temple Smith, in association with
the University of Bradford, 1983); Ian Donnachie
and George Hewitt, Historic New Lanark: The Dale
and Owen Industrial Community since 1785 (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993).
37Pickstone, Medicine, 142–3.
38Patrick Joyce, Work, Society and Politics: The Culture
of the Factory in Later Victorian England (Brighton:
Harvester, 1980), 206–7; and White, Limits of Trade
Union Militancy, 155.
39Beattie, Blackburn, 40, 42–4.
40Ibid., 47.
41Ibid., 47.












employers helped frame the town’s boundaries for public health reform and formed part
of the solution to public health problems.
Compared to other Lancashire towns during the latter half of the nineteenth century,
Blackburn had a good record of investment in sanitation and structural reforms. Before
the First World War, four successive Blackburn MOsH tackled the town’s air pollution,
improved housing, sanitation, infant mortality and the atmosphere in workplaces—with
some success. Their efforts were not limited to sanitation and the infectious disease
that are often solely attributed to MOH success.42 Expenditure on waterworks, sewers
and refuse disposal increased and new building regulations ensured adequate yard
space for new homes to an extent not found in most Lancashire towns.43 These early suc-
cesses served to increase the power of the MOH and led them to broaden their efforts.
Under the broader remit of disease prevention, the Blackburn MOsH encouraged local
employers to address specific health concerns in factories, including workers’ spitting,
sanitation and overall cleanliness. They also argued that steaming could spread consump-
tion and other respiratory diseases.44 Yet the MOsH also recognised the centrality of the
factories to the local economy and compromised. If employers deemed steaming essential
to production, then cloakrooms should be provided to keep outdoor clothes dry, factory
ventilation improved and clean water provided for humidifiers.45 At the same time, the
Blackburn MOsH actively sought legislation banning steaming on health grounds.
The Blackburn MOH, Dr Stephenson, was a particularly vocal and ardent campaigner
for factory reform. He helped persuade the Borough to conduct an enquiry into steaming,
where he also gave evidence—along with operatives, employers and the factory inspec-
torate. In 1888, this Committee agreed with Stephenson that the heavy steaming prac-
tised in Blackburn contributed to the town’s high death rates from respiratory
diseases.46 When by 1897 the town had implemented few reforms, Stephenson took
his case to a Parliamentary inquiry. He argued that steaming contributed to the ‘wholesale
slaughter of the inhabitants’ of the town (Roscoe’s report).47 While Roscoe’s report
covered many Lancashire towns, Stephenson’s persistence and outspokenness against
steaming at both the local and national level meant that Blackburn’s employers could
not simply ignore the working environment. Stephenson ensured that it would be incor-
porated into Blackburn’s public health context.
42E.g. Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infections,
Disease and the Rise of Preventive Medicine,
1856–1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
293–6.
43In the latter half of the nineteenth century 270 square
feet of yard space was standard for new homes in
Blackburn, compared with 150 for Preston, 70 for
Manchester (between 1868–70) and 240 in Hudders-
field. Nigel Morgan, ‘Infant Mortality, Flies and
Horses in Later-Nineteenth-Century Towns: A Case
Study of Preston’, Continuity and Change, 2002,
17, 107 and 131, n. 33; Stefan Muthesius, The
English Terraced House (London: Yale University
Press, 1983), 126.
44Lancashire Record Office (henceforth LRO) HRBL/2/1/1,
Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the Year
1887, Borough of Blackburn (henceforth Blackburn
MOH Report), 9; LRO HRBL/2/1/3, Blackburn MOH
Report, 1891, 26; LRO HRBL/2/1/8, Blackburn MOH
Report, 1898, 79, 66; LRO HRBL/2/1/9, Blackburn
MOH Report, 1899, 76–9 and LRO HRBL/2/1/10,
Blackburn MOH Report, 1902, 125, 143–4, also
cited in Greenlees, ‘Stop Kissing’, 230.
45LRO HRBL/2/1/3 Blackburn MOH Report, 1890, 26;
LRO HRBL/2/1/8 Blackburn MOH Report, 1896,
60–1; LRO HRBL/2/1/8 Blackburn MOH Report,
1897, 62–6; LRO HRBL/2/1/10 Blackburn MOH
Report, 1902, 143–4; Public Health, Feb. 1903,
284, also cited in Greenlees, ‘Stop Kissing’, 230.
46E. Billington, Report of the Special Committee
appointed to Enquire into the Subject of Steaming
in Weaving Sheds (with Evidence Tendered to
Them), (Blackburn: Blackburn Corporation, 1888).
47Roscoe, Report, Evidence, 10.












Blackburn employers responded to the MOsH concerns with various measures that did
not impede production.48 In 1896 the Blackburn Manufacturers’ Association sought their
own comparative information about the number of ‘absentees through illness in the
weaving shed’, as compared with other departments.49 While the results remain
unknown, shortly thereafter the employers invested in new facilities to store workers’
outdoor clothing; they more rigorously followed the atmospheric requirements of the
Factory Acts; and, many installed new humidifiers and hygrometers.50 None of these
changes impeded production.
Blackburn employers recognised that certain economic benefits were associated with a
healthier factory environment. In August 1913, John Taylor, Secretary of the Employers’
Association, wrote numerous complaints to Messrs Baird & Tatlock, Ltd, Scientific Instru-
ment makers, about the delays in the delivery of new hygrometers, while also defending
to the Factory Inspectorate the employers’ right to manage and arrange their own mills as
they saw fit.51 To manufacturers, Taylor promoted the production benefits attributable to
an improved working environment. In September 1913, he wrote to the manager of
Messrs Wilding Bros Ltd. that: ‘The atmosphere in your shed is very bad and it will pay
you to take steps to improve the ventilation, as it will greatly benefit the operatives and
therefore tend to increase your production.’52 The link between work, health and
profits was clear. It was acknowledged by physicians, employers and weavers alike.
Indeed, mill workers had protested rising steam levels by staging a series of impromptu
strikes and walkouts in the years prior to the First World War.53 While after the November
1913 strike employers sought to reassert their control and threatened to dismiss any
future strikers, at the same time, many were purchasing new atmospheric technologies.
The link between workers’ health and the socioeconomic needs of production was clear.
Judging the impact of public health reforms is difficult because there is no singular
outcome or sole contributing factor to either success or failure. In Blackburn, some
improvements were made to the factory environment. The town also invested in
broader public health initiatives, including sanitary structures, converting remaining pail
closets to water closets, increasing cemetery provision, improving refuse disposal and
improving the town’s water supply with new reservoirs on the outskirts of Blackburn.54
Yet the town’s maternal and infant mortality rates remained high, as did the rates of res-
piratory diseases. Rather, the period before the War illustrates how the town incorporated
the working environment into its health agenda, while employers incorporated it into
48LRO HRBL/2/1/3 Blackburn MOH Report, 1890, 26;
LRO HRBL/2/1/8, Blackburn MOH Report, 1896,
60–1; LRO HRBL/2/1/8 Blackburn MOH Report,
1897, 62–6; LRO HRBL 2/1/10 Blackburn MOH
Report, 1902, 143–4; Public Health, Feb. 1903, 284.
49Winding and warehouse departments. LRO
DDX1115/1/2 Blackburn Manufacturers’ Association,
Minute Book, 1896–1913 (henceforth, Minute Book)
Meeting of 19 June 1896.
50LRO DDX 1115/4/2 Blackburn and District Cotton
Manufacturers’ Association, Letter Book, 1906–1913
(henceforth, Letter Book), 19 April 1912; 20 Nov.
1912.
51LRO DDX 1115/4/2 Letter Book, 1906–1913, John
Taylor, Secretary to Messrs Baird & Tatlock, Ltd., Sci-
entific Instrument Makers, 31 August (probably
1912); J. Taylor to B. A. Whittelegge, C.B., M.D.,
H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories, Home Office,
London, LRO DDX 1115/4/2 Letter Book,
1906–1913, 1 May 1913.
52Messrs Wilding Bros Ltd, Alexandra Mills in Preston.
LRO DDX 1115/4/2 Letter Book, 1906–1913, John
Taylor to T. Telly Esq., Messrs Wilding Bros Ltd., Alex-
andra Mills, Preston, 1 Sept. 1913.
53LRO DDX 1115/4/2 Letter Book, 1906–1913, 13 Nov.
1912 and 18 Nov. 1913.
54Beattie, Blackburn, 65–7.












their business accumulation matrix. The overall impact of these measures on the health of
the town was unclear and probably marginal.
After the First World War, Blackburn’s community health context changed alongside
local industrial decline. The latter partly related to the town’s insular nature, but was
mostly due to its limited cloth range and reliance on an Indian market which had increased
its own cloth production during the war. By 1921, employment levels in cotton ran at
about half their 1920 peak, which continued throughout 1921 and 1922 and into
1923. By 1930, Blackburn’s unemployment rate was over 40 per cent and in 1936,
when a temporary industrial recovery started, half the insured weavers in Blackburn
and Darwen were either unemployed or on reduced earnings.55 Throughout the interwar
period, some years were inevitably economically better than others. Yet the high unem-
ployment rates shown in Table 4, combined with widespread poverty, make it unsurpris-
ing that the survival of the town’s core industry was prioritised by employers, physicians,
workers and local government. Indeed, employment and a living wage are core contrib-
utors to a town’s health.
At the same time, the associated health implications of poverty also need consideration.
Table 3 demonstrates that while infant mortality rates (IMR) in Lancashire textile towns
gradually declined, they lagged behind the improvements elsewhere in England and
Wales. Moreover, the IMR in certain textile communities, including Burnley and
Preston, remained considerably higher than elsewhere. Elizabeth Roberts has argued
that there was a complex, but valid, ‘relationship between a low standard of living and
high infant mortality rates.’ Moreover, the effect of general economic and social condi-
tions had a greater impact on IMR than the mismanagement or neglect of children by
working-class mothers.56 Yet both contemporaries and historians have blamed
mothers, especially those who worked, for the neglect of their children and high maternal
and infant mortality rates.57 While explaining high IMR in textile towns is beyond the
scope of this article, the evidence here supports Roberts’ argument about the significance
of environmental factors contributing to high infant mortality rates. During the peak years
of the recession, 1930–33, Blackburn’s unemployment rate was constantly higher than in
Burnley, particularly women’s, yet the town’s IMR was usually lower. Blackburn’s efforts at
addressing the unhealthy living and working environment may well have contributed to
this figure, but so too might the increased ability of mothers to care for their own children.
More broadly, if we look at the town’s overall mortality rates, the improvements of
earlier years stagnated during the interwar years (Tables 1 and 2). While direct links
between unemployment and mortality are tenuous, unemployment may have contributed
to the stagnation because local and national governments had multiple problems to
address. While it is difficult to argue that the neglect of the working environment in
55Pope, Unemployment, 104–08; E. M. Gray, The
Weavers’ Wage: Earnings and Collective Bargaining
in the Lancashire Cotton Weaving Industry (Manches-
ter: Victoria University, 1937), 28–30.
56Roberts, Woman’s Place, ch. 4 and 168.
57Eg. Carol Dyhouse, ‘Working Class Mothers and
Infant Mortality in England, 1895–1914’, Jnl. Soc.
Hist., (1978), 12, 2, 248–67; Anna Davin, ‘Imperial-
ism and Motherhood’, Hist. Wkshp, 1978, 5, 9–65;
Ellen Ross, Love and Toil: Motherhood in Outcast
London, 1870–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993); Laura Marks, Metropolitan Maternity:
Maternal and Infant Welfare Services in Early Twenti-
eth Century London (Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996);
Annual Report of the Preston Medical Officer of
Health, 1902; George Newman, Infant Mortality.
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the interwar years contributed to this stagnation, its inclusion in the broad public health
agenda of earlier may have indirectly contributed to earlier improvements.
Interest in the working environment began to decline shortly after the First World
War. As Reynolds demonstrated with Saltaire, paternalism both prospered and declined
alongside the local economy.58 During and immediately after the war, Blackburn employ-
ers still acknowledged their ‘duty to look after the health of their work people’, but
emphasised municipal provision and even that was reluctant.59 Employers rapidly with-
drew from local and national public health initiatives due to the recession and a
growing belief that the state should increase its provision under the National Insurance Act.
Moreover, during the 1920s, conflicting evidence emerged about whether heat and
humidity was actually harmful to workers’ health.60 Earlier studies of the effect of steam-
ing on operatives’ health examined mortality rates. These were now discounted because
the majority of weavers were women and mortality figures for women were difficult to
collect unless they died while still working. Moreover, death certificates did not always
describe women as weavers. However, in 1924 and 1925 Bradford Hill completed a
study of weavers’ sickness rates in wet and dry sheds and found no difference in these
rates between wet and dry towns. In fact, some dry sheds were also found to have
high humidity levels due to geography. This made it easier for employers to ignore
working conditions.
Employers also tried to reduce their expenditure on health initiatives. They refused to
adopt the proposed Welfare Work scheme and sought to reduce their contributions to
both the Blackburn and East Lancashire Royal Infirmary and theWorkers’ Health Insurance
Table 4. Annual mean unemployment levels in Blackburn and Burnley, 1927–1938
Year Blackburn Burnley
Men Women Men Women
1927 11.0 8.9 8.5 9.4
1928 13.2 14.7 9.6 10.0
1929 15.3 14.8 11.9 11.2
1930 34.4 56.1 27.7 39.2
1931 39.9 56.4 33.2 45.0
1932 33.0 39.7 21.1 26.2
1933 34.1 36.7 22.7 28.3
1934 30.9 33.3 22.4 25.7
1935 29.5 34.0 21.0 25.1
1936 26.3 31.4 18.5 22.9
1937 19.5 23.8 14.7 19.3
1938 25.4 38.5 21.9 32.6
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Labour, Local Unemployment Index, Nos 1–12.n and 1–24 (new series)
(HMSO, London, 1927–29, 1930–38), as cited in Rex Pope, Unemployment and the Lancashire Weaving
Area, 1920–1938 (Preston: University of Central Lancashire, Harris Paper Three, 2000), 29.
58Reynolds, Great Paternalist.
59LRO DDX 1115/1/3 Blackburn & District Cotton Man-
ufacturers’ Association, Minutes 12 Nov. 1913–20,
Jan. 1919; Blackburn & East Lancashire Royal
Infirmary, Proposals for Increased Financial Support,
1918.
60Bradford Hill, Artificial Humidification. Also discussed
in Fowler, Lancashire Cotton Operatives, 162–3.












Fund.61 Shortly after the passing of the 1929 Local Government Act that empowered
County Boroughs to appropriate Poor Law institutions, the employers resolved: ‘… that
the cost of Health and Unemployment Insurance is a very grevious burden on the over-
head charges of the Trade, and that this should be a direct charge on the Nation, and
not on industry and further we strongly urge the Central Committee without delay to
form a deputation to the Government on this matter.’62 The timing is indicative. The
Local Government Act is usually considered the point of departure for municipal involve-
ment in hospital provision. Indeed, in 1929 the County took over the local Workhouse and
associated infirmary. Possibly due to the continued negative association of the now
Queen’s Park Institution with the Poor Law and possibly from declining municipal
funds, as well as continued paternalistic inclinations and historic precedent, the employers
sustained their Infirmary contributions. This sum was nominal in comparison with the con-
tributions of workers and other donors and particularly in relation to rapidly rising health-
care costs.63 Yet it is clear that not only was the community health context changing, so
too were local understandings of the boundaries of the health remit. Institutional initia-
tives were replacing preventive medicine.
Blackburn municipality invested little in healthcare. By 1936, Blackburn spent below the
national average on health services and public health initiatives, as did other boroughs in
the economically depressed north-west.64 Indeed, as Table 5 demonstrates, of the leading
cotton manufacturing towns of Bolton, Blackburn, Burnley, Oldham and Preston, only
Bolton spent less per 1000 of population on healthcare. While there was no sustained
public outcry to low spending, this could only have had a detrimental effect on services
and new initiatives, as well as health on the shop floor. Responsibility for health and
safety now lay with the state and individuals. While the Blackburn MOsH blamed
mothers for the high maternal and infant mortality rates, employers posted signs inform-
ing employees of their personal responsibility for accident and disease prevention.65
Emphasising individual responsibility narrowed the public health remit and reduced the
MOH’s accountability. Earlier campaigns to explain the impact of poverty and the environ-
ment on the town’s health were replaced by a growing interest in collecting statistics and
producing increasingly repetitive reports.
Indeed, the decline of cotton’s economic dominance in Blackburn shook the town’s
political and urban structure after the First World War. The council did not invest in
61LRO DDX 1115/1/4, Minute Book, 22 Jan. 1919–25
Jan., 1923, 14 May 1922; E.g. LRO DDX 1115/1/7
Minute Book, 23 Sept. 1931–3 Jan. 1939, 5 Sept.
1935 and 20 Jan 1927; LRO DDX 1115/1/6, Minute
Book, 5 October 1927–7 Sept. 1931, 29 Jan. 1930.
62LRO DDX 1115/1/6, Minute Book, 5 October 1927–7
Sept. 1931, 5 Feb 1930.
63Voluntary Hospital Database, <www.
hospitalsdatabase.lshtm.ac.uk> (accessed 2 Feb.
2011). M. Gorsky, J. Mohan and M. Powell, ‘British
Voluntary Hospitals, 1871–1938: The Geography of
Provision and Utilization’, Journal of Historical Geog-
raphy, 1999, 25, 463–82; and M. Gorsky, M. Powell
and J. Mohan, ‘British Voluntary Hospitals and the
Public Sphere: Contributions and Participation
before the National Health Service’, in Steve Sturdy
(ed.), Medicine, Health and the Public Sphere in
Britain, 1600–2000 (London: Routledge, 2002),
123–44.
64Levene et al., Cradle to Grave, 52 and 54.
65The MOH cited women’s refusal to avail themselves
of healthcare and an increased use of the self-
administration of abortifacients. Blackburn MOH
Report, 1934, 153–4. E.g. Using spittoons and the
self-prevention of epitheliomas amongst mule spin-
ners. LRO DDX 1115/9/2 Minute Book, 4 June–13
May 1939, 12 Nov. 1923, 29 June 1932 and 2 May
1938, Textile employers were asked to post disease
prevention posters; LRO DDX 1115/1/6 Minute
Book, 5 Oct. 1927–7 Sept., 1931, 7 May 1928.












Table 5. Expenditure by Lancashire districts per Thousand on Major Health Services, 1936/7, and Percentage Change From 1922/3

















Blackburn 23.84 53.97 60.56 91.78 80.54 406.40 –101.42 82.63 –14.58 34.23 52.99
Bolton 22.63 56.74 43.64 46.82 68.59 348.00 –142.67 81.15 14.74 14.22 50.86
Burnley 21.64 54.27 53.82 111.26 130.61 497.06 –120.73 82.77 3.29 42.99 34.11
Bury 16.35 41.03 60.67 77.08 68.89 426.68 –93.34 85.05 –33.52 –30.37 49.68
Oldham 18.65 46.77 82.07 91.70 130.18 479.07 –66.94 87.07 18.28 37.75 84.66
Preston 18.17 42.27 62.80 99.96 80.85 415.95 –175.25 77.77 13.24 44.93 61.68
Rochdale 15.60 39.13 86.06 120.70 121.14 485.77 –72.57 86.66 –4.39 1.43 36.56
Mean for England
& Wales*
42.85 74.02 94.50 112.81 99.55 N/A –10.75 81.41 15.76 32.14 52.07
Standard Deviation
England & Wales*
46.86 46.59 33.90 39.11 37.75 N/A 575.57 12.20 35.74 29.30 18.38
* Both the mean and standard deviation are derived from the full data set of 84 districts in England and Wales as cited in the Local Government Financial Statistics, 1922/3
and 1936/7.
Note: Mean and standard deviation figures have not been calculated for total expenditure minus general hospitals in 1936 because the latter category was not a uniform
head of expenditure across the whole dataset.
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infrastructure, housing or other urban improvements. Instead, managing unemployment
and the unemployed during the interwar recession became the priority.66 Unemployment
in weaving communities such as Blackburn and Burnley was particularly acute due to high
female participation rates in the labour force; approximately one-half of women worked
compared to the national average of under one-third. Moreover, alternative occupations
for females were particularly difficult to find and were hindered by the low geographic
mobility of married women. The Anomalies Act of 1931 tightened regulations concerning
benefits to certain groups, including married women, disqualifying approximately one-
quarter of women in weaving towns for relief.67 Such high unemployment rates meant
that local councils prioritised relief for the unemployed over health reforms or investment
in structural improvements.
Compared with many East Lancashire industrial towns, Blackburn’s housing stock
remained in quite good condition and it was less than 50 years old. Indeed, the MOH,
Dr V. Thierens, did not believe Blackburn had any real slums and only houses let as lodg-
ings were in poor repair and suffered overcrowding.68 Hence, few jobs were created in
building or upgrading municipal housing. Moreover, in 1938, a report made to the
Pilgrim Trust highlighted the overwhelming poverty in the town and noted that ‘the pre-
dominant impression which Blackburn leaves is that of grimness…’69
By the Second World War, Blackburn had physically changed little since 1914, as had
the internal workings of the factories—machines and conditions. Unemployment
remained high and most people still lived in Victorian terraced housing. Moreover, and
perhaps unsurprisingly, the town’s political leadership lacked ideas to reinvigorate the
town when its core industry was in severe decline. The town’s people became increasingly
alienated from the cotton industry because it was unable to provide employment security
or a decent living wage. Nevertheless, for a limited time, Blackburn’s public health agenda
was broad and inclusive enough to make the working environment an important part of
the town’s community health context.
Burnley and the Divergences in Working Environments
and the Public Health Agenda
While only about eleven miles east of Blackburn, Burnley framed its public health differ-
ently due to local economic, political and social peculiarities. Like Blackburn, the Burnley
mills produced cheap cloth for export, although more medium weight grey cloths than
plain dhooties. However, whereas in the late nineteenth century Blackburn mill ownership
was concentrated in the hands of only a few, mostly middle-class families, in Burnley, a
number of weaving firms operated as cooperatives. More common were small, family
firms, and the ‘room and power’ scheme, whereby space in sheds could be rented
cheaply, which provided opportunities for working-class men to become bosses. Modify-
ing Reynolds argument concerning the self-interested philanthropy of industrialists, in
66A Report made to the Pilgrim Trust, Men without
Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1938),
67Rex Pope, ‘The Unemployment Problem in Northeast
Lancashire, 1920–1938’, (unpublished MLit thesis,
Lancaster University, 1974), 222–5, 230–1.
68Blackburn MOH Report, 1928, 28; Blackburn MOH
Report, 1929, 30, 32; and Blackburn MOH Report,
1930, 39.
69Men without Work, 82.












Burnley, the limited employer paternalism was directed towards municipal benefit rather
than towards employees.70 Employers’ contributed to both social welfare programmes
designed to aid the town’s less fortunate residents and to indicators of civic pride and per-
sonal status, including funding schools, churches and chapels.71 Although these initiatives
were broadly important to the health of city residents, innovations did not extend to the
workplace.
Burnley’s local government adopted a consistently laissez faire approach to industry and
prioritised broad municipal socialism over more concrete public health reforms. Welfarism
occurred without rather than within the factory. Municipal investment was designed to
improve the town’s public image and aid the broader well-being of residents. Burnley
municipality installed street lights, parks, recreation fields and gardens in order to
provide opportunities for socially acceptable, or rational, recreation, while the fresh air
and exercise countered the oppressive climate within the factories. These facilities were
well used, with Burnley having many football and cricket teams by the 1880s.72 While
these contributed to the broader well-being of the residents of the town, they did not
address the poverty and substandard housing. Indeed, direct health innovations in the
town were minimal. The town’s inability to retain Poor Law doctors due to their refusal
to pay the going rate for the area, combined with Burnley being the last major industrial
town in Lancashire to build an Infirmary in 1886, reveals much about how the council pri-
oritised health before the First World War.73
The Burnley MOsH did little to promote health reform, although they experienced some
successes in addressing certain mortality and morbidity issues, particularly childhood ill-
nesses.74 They blamed residents, but particularly mothers, for high infant mortality
rates, the ill health of children and unclean houses. They argued that the latter allowed
the spread of germs. Indeed, at the turn of the century, Burnley had the unenviable dis-
tinction of having one of the highest infant mortality rates in the country and vied with
Preston for the highest overall death rate in Lancashire during the ensuing decades (see
Tables 1–3). Similar to other Lancashire towns with high female employment rates, the
Burnley MOsH blamed the high IMR firmly on mothers working.75 Starting with Burnley’s
first MOH, Dr Thomas Dean, three successive MOsH made similar complaints about how
the ‘engagement of mothers in cotton mills and weaving sheds during the day, necessi-
tates the hiring out of infants to nurse and the exposure of them to the cold morning air in
winter time whilst in transit to the house of the nurse.… This evil is indispensable from a
cotton town, where woman’s labour is highly paid…’76 Yet Roberts has shown how Lan-
cashire working-class women did not view their employment as a contributor to their
babies’ deaths. Women’s explanations included difficult births and attributed this to
working in the late stages of pregnancy. Roberts also found that women who had
70Reynolds, Great Paternalist, chs 2 and 6.
71Russell, Political Stability, 254.
72Ibid., 133.
73British Medical Journal (7 June 1913), 1, no. 2736,
1254; The Medical Officer, 28 December, 1912,
23–4.
74LRO CBBu 6/1 1874–93, Annual Report of the
Burnley Corporation Officials, including MOH (here-
after Burnley MOH Report), 1923, 80, 50.
75Roberts, Woman’s Place, 164–5.
76Burnley MOsH: Dr Thomas Dean (1874–1906),
Dr Thomas Holt (1906–31) and when he retired,
Dr D C Lamont (1931–39+). LRO CBBu 6/1
1874–93, Burnley MOH Report for year ending 25
March 1883, 29. See also Burnley MOH Report, 25
March 1886, 31; LRO CBBu6/4 Burnley MOH
Reports, 1905–1908, 4–5; Burnley MOH Report for
nine months ending 31 Dec. 1906, 17, etc.












never done any full-time work after marriage lost as many or more babies than women
who worked.77 Indeed, as Roberts and others have argued, the real explanations
behind high infant mortality rates were complex. They probably included ignorance,
the general environment (including the quality of housing and any overcrowding),
poverty, child rearing practices—especially surrounding feeding, and local physicians’
indifference to the poor and their associated refusal to attend in poor neighbourhoods
throughout the early decades of the twentieth century.78
To address the high IMR that Dean attributed to mothers’ working, Dean proposed
opening crèches with trained carers. These were not forthcoming; nor were there any
guarantees that women would use them due to women’s preference for having relatives
care for their children or uncertainty that crèches would solve the problems.79 Indeed, the
multiple contributors to infant mortality, combined with Burnley’s sweeping health prob-
lems, meant that tackling the issue required a much broader approach than Dean
proposed.
In terms of broader morbidity and mortality, the Burnley MOsHmakes clear the lack of a
medical consensus in Lancashire concerning disease causation. In the late nineteenth
century, the MOH, Dr Thomas Dean, complained that the town’s people were too
fussy about the town’s environment: ‘People have no right to expect the pure air of a
desert in a thickly populated manufacturing town where everything, both mechanical
and human is at high pressure.’80 Dean went on to blame the prevalence of lung diseases
in harsh winters, such as bronchitis and phthisis, on workers. He patronizingly stated: ‘I
wish I could believe that factory and workshop folks have paid more attention to my reit-
erated advice to breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth, on leaving warm
workshops in Winter.’81 The factories were not considered a core site for disease and
hence, they were not included in the public health agenda.
In 1921, Dean’s successor, Dr Thomas Holt, agreed that individuals were responsible for
their own ill health. He explained that ‘[W]hatever the community does in combating
disease will be of little use unless it can get the individual to show a better appreciation
of the value of personal cleanliness in its widest sense, as well as the value of health sur-
roundings and pure atmosphere (at home).’82 While there are some truths surrounding
individual responsibility for cleanliness, Holt’s judgement that Burnley’s residents did
not appreciate cleanliness lacks evidence. Indeed, Roberts’ study of Preston revealed
that women kept their homes as clean as possible. She highlights the time constraints
working women faced with the double shift of factory work and housework, when
their husbands’ contribution stopped with a portion of their pay packet. Consequently,
standards of cleanliness were below what many women would have liked.83 There is
no reason to doubt the experiences of other Lancashire women differed greatly.
77Roberts, Woman’s Place, 164–5.
78Ibid., 164–8; Jill Liddington and Jill Norris, One Hand
Tied Behind Us: Rise of the Women’s Suffrage Move-
ment (London: Virago, 1985), 58–9. Walton, Lanca-
shire, 310; Burnley Gazette, 26 Feb, 1908, as cited
in Trodd, ‘Political Change’, 92.
79Roberts, Woman’s Place, 166–7.
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While both women and children suffered from the duality of mothers’work, employers’
goals of working faster and cutting corners made it difficult for all cotton operatives, male
and female, to avoid illness and injury. Many operatives needed to retire in their 40s,
rather than their 60s.84 Yet ill health and injuries were common to most weaving
towns and need to be paralleled with community investment in housing and broader
public health initiatives, particularly sanitation. Here, Burnley differed from Blackburn.
Somewhat ironically, the Burnley MOsH deflection of health responsibility to residents
came shortly after Burnley’s local Government Board was forced to admit that it had not
taken the necessary steps to remedy the poor condition of the town’s housing in line with
the requirements of the Housing Acts of 1890 and 1909.85 Much of Burnley’s housing
stock was back-to-back with poor ventilation. As late as 1932, the then MOH,
Dr D. C. Lamont complained that much of the town’s housing did not conform ‘to
present day standards of hygienic dwellings…, the majority of which needed to be
rebuilt.’86 While Burnley council invested in new sanitary structures, including drains
and sewers, these suffered delays, as did the building of new houses.87 Hence, reducing
overcrowding was a slow process but one that contributed to a decline in contagious
diseases.
Burnley municipality’s conceptual framework of health emphasised individual and
family responsibility. The town employed female sanitary inspectors to visit houses and
advise mothers and nurses how best to bring up and feed infants. Living in poor accom-
modation and earning low wages, with dual burdens of work and home, many women
found addressing the inspectors’ requests impossible. However, their older children ben-
efitted from free school meals, designed to prevent the pauperisation of families, to some
success. When in 1931 and 1932 a high proportion of Burnley school children received
free school meals, this was accompanied by low levels of malnutrition.88 As in Blackburn,
public health reform in Burnley had mixed results. The Burnley emphasis on individual and
family responsibility for health reform reflected the council’s unwillingness to invest in
widespread public health improvements. Furthermore, the town’s narrow public health
remit consistently excluded the workplace.
In such a complex context, it is unsurprising that Burnley’s employers were able to
ignore the working environment. Indeed, prior to the First World War, Burnley’s employ-
ers gained a notorious reputation for their working environment. They practised heavy
steaming and had an infamous reputation for ‘driving’ their weavers—pressure from over-
lookers to work faster.89 They were also known for their repressive discipline, as evident
when they refused to compromise during the strikes and the ensuing violence over the
Burnley wage ‘lists’ during the 1870s. Employers expected and strove for complete
control in the workplace. Strikes in both the town’s textile and coal industries were
84Walton, Lancashire, 309–10; Alice Foley, A Bolton
Childhood (Manchester: Manchester University,
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regarded as social insubordination that must be suppressed. In response, the Burnley
weavers became a particularly well-organised, militant and political union. They labelled
Burnley employers ‘about the most grasping and penurious in the four Counties.’90 Yet
despite these conflicts, violent confrontations in Burnley occurred only intermittently
and crystallised around industrial relations. Even then, non-violent collective bargaining
was encouraged. Indeed, in economic downturns, the Burnley cotton masters made
great efforts to maintain their firm’s viability and protect as many jobs as possible. This
contributed to a pervasive understanding of fairness amongst employers and workers,
but one that did not directly incorporate health. Health was only attached to employment
and wages, and importantly so. Health risks attributable to work, injuries and fatigue,
were neglected.
During the twentieth century, local government responsibilities grew while the pres-
ence of textile employers on the Burnley council declined. These changes did not result
in the council challenging employers to reform working conditions. Instead, the council
remained focused on economic concerns and broader municipal improvements. The
lack of a strong local authority or voice for factory reform enabled employers to ignore
Factory Legislation and weavers’ protests and strikes over working conditions, including
‘excessive steaming’, the temperature (too high or too low), poor ventilation, excessive
steam, weavers’ cough, insufficient drinking water, etc.91 Moreover, the employers’ asso-
ciation was never united. They did not support each other when prosecuted for violating
factory legislation. For example, in December 1900, Witham Brothers Ltd received the first
Burnley prosecution for violating heat and humidity legislation. While the firm sought
support from the Burnley Manufacturers’ Association, it was not forthcoming.92
However, fines for violating the Act were small—approximately £5. Hence, while the
Manufacturers Association lacked unity, at the same time, cohesion was unnecessary
because local government, including the MOH employed by the council, did not challenge
the laissez faire business climate.
After the First World War, Burnley employers continued to benefit from the laissez faire
climate. After another local firm was prosecuted for violating legislation, the Burnley Man-
ufacturers’ Association recommended that members ‘maintain a more satisfactory tem-
perature [and ventilation] in sheds and twisting rooms.’93 This was more lip-service
than a strong recommendation. It was not followed up, nor was any noticeable pressure
placed on managers to change business practices. In cases of accident or injury, employers
preferred to pay compensation rather than install safety equipment or unite with other
employers over liability issues. They ignored government regulation during the interwar
period, refusing to provide the more and better water taps that the Factory Inspector,
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1887, as cited in Trodd ‘Political Change’, 32.
91E.g. LRO DDX 1145/1/1/2, Burnley Master Cotton
Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association, Minute
Book (hereafter Minutes), 23 Nov. 1899–6 Apr.
1909, 30 Dec. 1901, LRO DDX 1145/1/1 Minutes,
29 May 1894–15 Nov. 1899, 30 Oct. 1895, 11 May
1896, 29 July 1896, 11 Sept 1896, 19 Oct. 1896,
1 March 1897, 23 April 1897, 22 May 1897, 21
Aug. 1897 and 9 March 1897; LRO DDX 1145/1/1/
3 Minutes, 25 June 1909–1 May 1919; 31 Jan
1911; 12 Sept. 1911; 25 Feb 1913; LRO DDX 1145/
1/1/4 Minutes, 29 May 1919–27 Sept. 1926, 12
Oct. 1922.
92LRO DDX 1145/1/1/2, Minutes, 23 Nov. 1899–6 Apr.
1909, 31 Dec. 1900 and 29 Jan 1901.
93LRO DDX 1115/9/1 Letter, 19 March 1918, from
F. A. Hargreaves, Secretary of the Burnley Master
Cotton Spinners’ & Manufacturers’ Association to
member.












Mr Clark, required in many of the town’s weaving sheds.94 Both then and later, employers
refused to meet the Factory Inspectors’ requirements. Instead, they continuously debated
their individual and collective responsibilities under the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880
and the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897.95 No direct link was made between
work and health. Instead, assumptions about the ‘nature of things’ created a narrow com-
munity health context and left unresolved many of the town’s public health problems.
By the mid-1930s, mortality rates in Burnley remained high. The town’s spending on
major health services per 1000 population focused on tuberculosis and maternal and
child welfare (Table 5). With these priorities it is unsurprising that in 1934, Lamont effec-
tively dismissed the textile industries as being a significant contributor to the ‘morbidity or
mortality’ of the town’s residents. Respiratory ill health was also deemed part of the
‘nature of things’.
Apart from the accepted prevalence of respiratory and rheumatic affections found
amongst textile workers, there does not appear to be any undue morbidity or mortal-
ity directly related to any one of the commoner occupations of the inhabitants; and
judging by the spectacular diminution of the death rate from respiratory diseases in
the present century, and allowing for the decrease in the numbers employed,
workers in textile processes would appear to suffer less severely from respiratory
affections now than formerly.96
Because Burnley’s narrow conceptual framework of health centred on morbidity and mor-
tality figures, many contributing factors to ill health were ignored, including sanitation,
housing, poverty and the working environment. Rather than engage with the root
causes of the city’s health problems, Burnley officials continuously deflected responsibility
to individuals and families and made only patchy, limited investment in structural works
and targeted tuberculosis and maternal and child welfare. Such priorities would also
have benefitted from improved sanitation. Indeed, in terms of congestion, poor
housing, mortality and illegitimacy, Burnley residents suffered more than Blackburn’s
before the First World War. Certain districts such as Sandygate remained untouched by
politicians, religious or union groups. These areas remained confined to a ‘culture of
poverty’ that ‘produced low self evaluation, pessimism and passivity’. While such districts
existed in Blackburn, they were either fewer in number or less noticeable to observers.97
While these pockets of poverty increased during the interwar recession and paralleled
Burnley’s, Blackburn’s housing was better quality and the mortality rates lower. Economic
decline in Burnley only served to increase the challenges associated with tackling the
housing and mortality conundrums.
Unsurprisingly, the lack of local, including medical, interest in a broad public health
agenda contributed to a decline in Burnley’s working environment. While many Lanca-
shire weaving towns utilised short-term working and temporary shortages, Burnley
employers also supplied inferior cotton while expecting workers to produce higher
94LRO DDX 1145/1/1/4, Minutes, 29 May 1919–27
Sept. 1926, 12 Oct. 1922.
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quality outputs. They manipulated existing piece-rate regulations to try and push employ-
ees to work for less than the legal wage rate, making unsurprising the trade union’s sus-
tained emphasis on wage-related issues. Employers also opposed innovations that were
spreading in other industries by the 1930s, such as paid holidays.98 Working conditions
remained poor. If anything, the emphasis on cutting corners, combined with ageing build-
ings and machinery, must have worsened conditions.
Thus, in Burnley the narrow public health agenda and the neglect of the working envi-
ronment reflected civic and community priorities. These lay elsewhere. It was easier for the
town to view the many problems surrounding health as moral issues than to directly tackle
them. For workers, the day to day struggle against poverty meant that working conditions
were rarely their top priority. Yet when industry was booming, as in the run up to the First
World War, the weavers struck over heavy steaming—to no effect. Instead, in Burnley,
much public health, and indeed, sanitary science more broadly, was afforded an individ-
ual, moral diagnosis, rather than a social or economic one. This narrow community health
context, combined with lacklustre legislation, meant little progress was made in public
health reform.
Conclusion
These studies of Blackburn and Burnley highlight the complexities surrounding public
health reform and defining its boundaries. The working environment was not simply
related to the external pressures of scientific expertise and regulation or labour manage-
ment relations as found by Melling, Bowden and Tweedale.99 Nor were the social attrib-
utes Stark describes for anthrax the defining attributes for the working environment.100
Instead, this article has argued that as a public health concern, the working environment
was defined by the social, economic and political attributes that set the parameters of the
local public health context.
This article also extends the work of Pickstone, McIvor, Bartrip and Fenn and others who
have argued the importance of politics, the unions and the national economy in influenc-
ing working conditions.101 While these may have been the case, this article presents evi-
dence that local factors were at least as, if not more, important as public health agendas
and national legislation in shaping attitudes towards the working environment. In Lanca-
shire, this was related to the nature of these towns where their economic reliance on
cotton textiles created a strong overlap between the workforce and community priorities.
Similar to Rosenberg’s argument about disease becoming a risk only after the community
agreeing and responding that it is, in Lancashire, the working environment became a risk
only after earning community agreement that such a risk existed. Indeed, the MOH was
only one figure, albeit an influential one, in public health reform. Politicians, employers,
workers, residents and broader economics all contributed to the health of the city and
helped set or resist local health agendas and priorities.
98Walton, Lancashire, 340.
99Melling, ‘Beyond a Shadow?’; Bowden and Twee-
dale, ‘Mondays without Dread’ and ‘Poisoned by
the Fluff’.
100Stark, ‘Factory Environment’.
101Pickstone, Medicine; McIvor, ‘State Intervention’;
Bartrip and Fenn, ‘Factory Fatalities’.












Stark has argued that diseases should be ‘defined by their far more visible public man-
ifestations rather than the biological properties primarily associated with specialist medical
research [and which] leads to a broader understanding of their cultural significance.’102
While this may have been true for anthrax, local specificities also shaped definitions of
disease, creating variations in meanings and understandings of health risks, as well as
approaches to managing and prioritising public health risks between communities. This
is clear when Blackburn is contrasted with Burnley. In Burnley, responsibility for health pre-
vention centred on the individual. The town’s narrow public health agenda related to lack
of a broader health interest by employers, physicians and local government. Despite a
Liberal council, this was hardly reflective of the New Liberalism, but rather a continuation
of nineteenth-century classical liberalism. The town’s relative poverty also meant that
workers rarely prioritised the working environment. Instead, it held an anomalous position
as part of the ‘nature of things’ rather than as part of the solution to the town’s health
problems.
More broadly, these case studies highlight the lack of consensus amongst physicians
and local government about disease aetiology and amongst MOsH about the remit of
their responsibilities. They also highlight both the limits and the necessity of legislation.
Legislation alone could not control health and safety at work because employers were
able to avoid it. For public health reforms to have succeeded in a factory environment,
or indeed any workplace, they needed to include a consensual framework that defined
the problem and that involved local physicians, employers, workers and local government.
Only then did the factory environment become part of a town’s public health agenda and
the issues addressed. However, further research is required if we are to fully comprehend
the importance of, and relationships between, local impetuses, industrial trends, regional
specificities, national health priorities and legislation in securing public health
improvements.
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